1. "Simple reflex movements" are those where the motor action resulting from the application of a stimulus has always the same form.
2.
" Reply-movements." They also result directly from a stimulus ; the motor actions have no constant form, but have always a distinct purpose corresponding to the disposable force. 3. "Voluntary or spontaneous movements" are those which take place without any direct antecedent cause being detected.2
The "automatic movements" he regards as "simple reflex movements," and they therefore belong to the first group. The limits of these groups are not well defined, as occurs everywhere in the division of the organic processes. On the other hand, the author has succeeded in finding a series of important signs by which one may ascertain which parts of the central nervous system are present in the frog. The proof of the existence of the brain is to test whether the animal, on being placed on its back turns again on its belly. If it makes no attempt at this, the section lies behind the medulla oblongata. If which the irritant was applied, and using the other limb when the leg stimulated is removed, or so fixed that it cannot be used?may be explained by mechanical arrangements, for the sound limb may be used without the one stimulated having been cut off at all.
As to whether a brainless frog also possesses sensation, nothing definite can be cited.
Pfiiiger believes that no sensory condition is fixed by the spinal cord, i.e., no recollections are retained by it, so that, at the moment when cerebral consciousness returns, no impressions previously received can be communicated from the spinal cord to the brain. In relation to this point, Wundt1 defines the difference between the action of a self-regulating mechanism and the will, and also the difference between a capacity which I may name the susceptibility for stimuli and sensation. The will alone, he remarks, is sufficient to indicate with almost absolute certainty the painful part; but with regard to its exact position, we perhaps have no precise knowledge, but probably obtain the information by investigating it through our own sense of touch and vision.
The voluntary use of our motor organs, and the conscious reaction to external stimuli, would be enormously increased if, in each individual case, it was necessary that we should have a clear conception of the amount of movement to be executed and of the seat of the sensation. We can, therefore, only assume that the will uses a mechanism which works accurately, and to which we only require to give the first impulse in order to obtain an exact fulfilment of our orders with relation to all existing circumstances. As the will is only an internal stimulus, which, after it has given the first impulse to movement, leaves the further course to the self-regulating physiological mechanism, so when the latter is set in action by any The latency therefore appears to be independent of the intensity of frequent (sV? *V") stimuli.
The excitability of course varies with each individual frog; but I found that artificial inspiration in the frog had no effect on the reflex processes.
Probably this may be explained by the large cutaneous inspiration in this animal.
Next, the effect of stimuli of medium frequency {?'? tV? tY')> the strength of the stimulus being varied, was investigated. With these intervals between the stimuli, the duration of the latent stimulation diminished when the sub-maximal stimuli were strengthened. The latent times decrease with increase of the strength of the stimulus. From the fact that in the opening induction shock strong oscillating discharges have been proved to exist by Bonders and Helmholtz,1 we are led to the idea that the reflex contractions produced by it are also to be regarded as the effects of summation. I found that a single induction shock of great intensity gave a reflex action after a long latent period (1'7") 
